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MONETARY UNION IN PRACTICE:
Lessons from European Monetary Union•

Sheriffdeen A. Tella,

Ph.D

Financial integration is harder to achieve than economic integration. The currency of a
co11111ry, like its flag, is the most importafll symbol of its separate idelllity ... so few African
countries will lightly part with their separate units ofcurrencies into a nebulous inefficient
central institution in the name offinancial integration .... 8111 like Ecclesiastes, if we stand
singly we risk the pain ofdeath, together in 011r weaknesses Africa will constitute a sleeping
giant that may and sho11Ld wake up in thef11lllre. (Is that f uture here?)
(Aluko, 1992)

L.
INTRODUCTION
Monetary integration is the heart of economic integration . While intra-regional trade
usua lly forms the primary focus of economic integration, the imperatives of monetary
integration , which involves ha1monising monetary and fiscal policies, as well as .integration
of the money and capital markets of the integrating partners, is never overlooked. The raison
d'etre for such harmonisation is underscored by the fact that regional stability founded on
sound economic framework and payments system, which monetary integration entails, tend
to withstand disrupti ve external shocks and the consequent grave implications of one or two
members abandoning the integration arrangement.
Full economic integration process that re legates monetary cooperation to the
background while establishing a custom union, as the first step, is bound to face problem of
foot-dragging when it finall y dec ides to return to the realm of monetary integration (Delors
Report, 1989). It is noteworthy that African countries are aware of the importance of
economic integration generally and the particular need to harmonise their macroeconomic
policies, which principally involve synchroni sation of monetary and fiscal policies as well
as promote efficient money and capital markets. Thus, monetary integration or monetary
union has been an integral part of the Treaties of most of the Regional Economic
Sheriffdeen A. Tella, Ph.D., is Lecturer, Department of Banking and Finance, 0/abisi Onabanjo University
Ago-lwoye, Og1111 Srare.
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Communities (RECs) in Africa. Chapter VI of the Treaty establishing the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is devoted to the issue of money finance
and payments systems. In this regard, Article 44, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Treaty state inter
alia:
Monetary cooperation will entail that member States shall, within a
time-table to be determined by the Assembly, harmonise their monetary,
financial and payments policies, in order to boost intra-community trade in
goods and services, to further the objectives of the community and to
enhance monetary and financial cooperation among Member States. 1
Conducive economic environment, which includes developed financial market, is a
necessary condition for achieving the objectives of monetary integration. Without such market
standard, the payments system would be cumbersome, the foreign exchange market under
flexible exchange regime would be highly distorted and more importantly, the use of
monetary policy will be highly ineffective.
It is within this context that this paper sets out to discuss the nature of the environment and the actual practice of monetary integration in the European Monetary Union,
which is regarded as the most successful among its peers in the world. The outcome of this
paper should be able to provide readers and listeners with the elements that bring about this
success story. The paper is divided into five sections including this introduction. Section 2
explains the definition, criteria and forms of monetary integration while Section 3 contains
the core of the paper which describes the practice of monetary integration in the European
Union (EU). Section 4 is the final section and contains summary and concluding remarks.

2.1. Definition, Forms and Criteria for Monetary Integration
The need to understand the definitions and criteria for successful monetary
integration efforts is germane for meaningful discussion of monetary union. Monetary

' This is also stated in Chapter VII of the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community.
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union is defined by Max Corden (1972)2 as involving two components viz. "exchange rate
union, that is, an area within which exchange rates bear a permanently fixed relationship to
each other. .. " and "convertibility - the permanent absence of all exchange controls, whether
for current or capital transactions within an area". Allen (1976)3 defines a monetary union
with the following characteristics: (i) a single money, or several currencies fully convertible
at immutably fixed exchange rate; (ii) an arrangement whereby monetary policy is
determined at the union level, allowing no national autonomy in monetary policy; and (iii)
a single exchange rate policy with a common pool of external reserves of members.
Masson and Pattillo (2001a) posit that "a monetary union is a zone where a single
monetary policy prevails and inside which a single currency or currencies which are perfect
substitutes circulate freely". Based on the definitions and criteria above, Chipeta and
Mkandawire (1994) expatiate on the characteristics of monetary union as:
Use of a common currency, or if there exists several currencies, the existence of a
permanently and rigidly fixed exchange rate relationship between the currencies.
11.
A common monetary and fiscal policy to ensure control over the creation of
high-powered money and the expansion of government debts.
u1.
A central management of the common pool of foreign exchange reserves, external
debts and exchange rate policy.
1v.
The existence of a regional monetary authority or central bank which should be the
sole issuer of the economy wide currency, in the case of a full currency union.
v.
Harmonisation of domestic credit which can be achieved by the imposition of credit
ceiling at the central monetary authority. The national monetary authorities retain
the allocation and distribution of domestic credit between sectors.
vi.
A common development bank to finance regional and national projects that will
assist in the integration processes and reduce economic disparities between the
member countries.
Five forms of monetary integration can be identified in literature. These are limited
currency convertibility, paraJlel currency union , partial monetary union, single currency
union and full economic and monetary union.4

1.

2
3

Cited by Masson and Pattillo (200 Ia)
Cited by Masson and Pattillo (200 Ia)
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Under the limited currency convertibility, all exchange restrictions involving the
use of the sub-regional currencies are removed. The countries involved agree to harmonise
their exchange rates and adopt a policy of uniform variation of these rates with the rest of
the world. The unrestricted exchange and use of the members' currencies make it essential
to have a clearing house through which transactions are channelled.
The parallel currency union situati on allows for the circulation of a common
currency along side national currencies, which have defined and fixed relationship with the
common currency. This is also referred to as mutual currency management arrangement
(Crocket, 1991). Thi s was the former system by the European Union under the European
Monetary System (EMS) and the current system in the Common Monetary Area (CMA) in
Southern Africa.
In the partial monetary union , the participating countries agree to implement the
same exchange rate regime (fixed or floating) and establish a fixed exchange rate between
their currencies and the regional rate. The single currency model involves the creation of a
monetary zone with a si ngle currency; a common pool of external reserve and the
management of monetary, fiscal and other financial policies are unified. However, each
member retains its central bank. This is the present model in the European Union (EU) and
is closest to full economic and monetary union where a single central bank is establi shed
to provide central banking services to all members. In this case, the common central bank
not only produces the region-wide currency but monetary policy is also centrally arranged,
based on some laid down criteria. Although members have the freedom to determine their
fiscal policy operations, the central arrangements have implicit influence on the domestic
fiscal policy. For instance, budget deficit could be fixed as a percentage of the reserve. The
common example exist in the CFA zones (CEMAC and UEMOA).
For any form of monetary union to succeed however, some criteria have to be
satisfied. It is important to discuss these criteria since the satisfaction of most of them had
contributed to the success of the EU.

' (for details see Crockett, 1991 ; Taylor. 1994; Chipcla and Mkandawire, 1994; Soyibo, 1998).
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Mundell (1961) posited that the degree offactor mobility within a currency union is
of utmost importance. In this connection, movement of labour and capital goods across
borders is not restricted such that it is easy for factors to move to areas where they can earn
maximum remuneration for the services rendered. Also within this scope, restriction on
repatriation of income of non-national is eliminated. An essential requirement here is the
presence of at least, an internally convertible currency within the union.

McKinnon (1963) opined that openness and regional interdependence are important
elements in monetary union. High intra-regional trade, for example, will bring about greater
benefit from the reduction in transaction cost associated with the use of a common currency.
However, large changes in the nominal exchange rate, e.g. large depreciation occasioned
from outside the area may generate disruptive movements in the cost ofliving across country.
This is why Frankel and Goldstein (1991) suggested that there should be a diversified
production base in the region. They contended that the more diversified an economy's
production structure, the less likely it is that a demand or supply shock to an industry (or an
economy) will cause an economy-wide disruption.

There must be a mix ofmacroeconomic policies to counter any country-specific real
shocks and stabilise the economy before economy-wide disruption occurs (Frankel and
Goldstein, 1991). Masson and Pattillo (2001b) contended that asymmetry .of shocks could
be less of a problem if there is substantial labour mobility or if there exists a system of fiscal
transfer across the region. Another important criterion is the existence of a developed capital
market. An integrated economy-wide capital market that is free from geographical restrictions
of any kind and aids capital movements is imperative in a currency zone (Dadzie, 1990).

The above set of criteria assumes the existence of a capitalist state where the market
mechanism works. Hence, the existence of a large private sector operating on free, deregulated
and competitive environment is taken for granted. While developed countries like those
within the European Union enjoy these operating elements, many developing countries,
including ECO WAS members, are just transiting to market economies and the dismantling
of tough regulations on the activities of the private sector has not been completed. Thus, the
absence of a vibrant private sector could constitute a big problem in the achievement of an
C JJ IV
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idea] monetary zone. This is because efficient banking and other financial businesses, as
well as trading, manufacturing, et cetera are within the purview of well-organised private
sector. Albeit, there should also exist availability of highly skilled manpower that can run
these businesses efficiently.

2.2

Benefits and Cost of Monetary Integration

All ventures have gains and losses, and this includes monetary integration exercise. It
is therefore desirable to create time to understand the benefits and costs, in order to
maximise the benefits and minimise the costs. These costs and benefits go beyond
economic alone but are also social and political. Jones (2000) succinctly highlights some of
the benefits thus5 :
1.

11.

m.
1v.

v.

The common pool of foreign exchange reserves provide reservoir for payments for
the transactions undertaken in intra-REC thus reducing cost of transactions within
the REC.
There will be a reduction in the cost of financial management and the elimination of
speculative capita] flow, thus relieving the national authorities of the frustration in
monetary control. The integration will aJlow the spreadjng of the overhead cost of
financial transactions widely.
Stability of the exchange rate and convertibility of the domestic currencies enhance
trade and optimal use of capital, as it is moved to where it will give highest reward.
The resulting integration of the capital market will enhance capital flow into the
region. Both foreign direct investments and portfolio investments will be
encouraged and this will have further positive effects on the budding stock exchange
markets.
The membership of a monetary union may help make the shocks hitting member
countries more symmetric and also expand intra-union trade. This is particularly
true if there is substantial labour mobility or if there is a system of fiscal transfer
across the region.

See also Frankel and Rose, ( 1998); Masson and Pattillo (2001a).
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The major losses include:
1.
Loss of autonomy of action in some areas of policy formulation. The cost of a
monetary union derives from the fact that when the country surrenders its national
currency, it invariably relinquishes an important instrument of economic policy. The
country will not be able to change the price of its currency at will nor determine its
money supply.
11.
Although the country can formulate and implement its fiscal policy, there is always
a link between monetary and fiscal policy. In the case of fiscal expansion to generate
employment for instance, the government wi ll have to rely on ly on fiscal tool like
reducing taxes alone, whereas this could have been complemented with the use of
interest rate and other monetary tools. Important ingenuity will thus be required to
carry on with "one-leg" independent policy.
111.
Problems of uneven development could occur if capital flows mainly to the more
developed countries, unless the fiscal compensation system is well developed to
reduce the stress. This is why a development finance institution must exist to use the
surplus in the economy-wide reserve for development assistance for less developed
members.
The foregoing sets of information necessarily provide the bedrock into the discussion that
will be undertaken in the succeeding section which is the kernel of this paper.

3.0

Monetary Union in Practice: The European Monetary Union

The core institution of the European Monetary Union is the European System of
Central Banks (ESCB) which comprises of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
central banks of the Member States. This is in accordance with Article 8 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community. Thus monetary union practices should focus on this
institution and this is the accepted format for this paper, albeit we consider a brief
discussion on the European Union or Community as imperative before detailed exposition
of the ESCB.
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3.1. The European Union
The European Common Market transformed into European Union in 1999 and
currently comprises of Austria, Belgium6 , Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain as membe rs. Although Denmark,
Sweden and the United Kingdom have always been and remain members of the Union, they
have not fully agreed with the tenets of the Union with respect to monetary union.
At the formation of the Union in 1999, the member countries accounted for 15.5 per
cent of world GDP and 32 per cent of world exports (IMF, 1999). From Table!, it is clear
that the group maintained the highest intra-regional trade amongst the existing trading blocs
in both the developed and developing countries. The intra-REC trade accounted fo r 60.8%
in 1980 and peaked at 65.9% in 1990 before declining to 55.5% in 1997. As at 1999, the
intra-regional trade was 62.6 per cent.
Table 3.1 : Intra-Regional Trade (1970 -1999)
(percentage of Total Export)
Regional Groupings

1970

1980

1985

1990 1995

1996

1997

1998 1999

ASEAN

22.9

18.7

19.8

19.8

25.4

25.4

25.0

2 1.7

22.2

COMESA

9. 1

6.1

4.7

6.6

7.8

8.0

7.9

8.6

7.5

ECOWAS

2.9

10. l

5.2

7.8

9.8

9.4

9.7

11.8

12.2

59.5

60.8

59.2

65.9

62.4

6 1.4

55.5

57.0

62.6

9.4

11.6

5.5

8.9

20.3

22.7

24.8

25.0

20.5

36.0

33.6

43.9

41.4

46.2

47.6

49. 1

51.7

54.6

SADC

8.0

2.0

3.8

4.8

8.7

9.4

10.4

10.2

9.3

UDEAC

4.9

1.6

1.9

2.3

2.2

2.3

2. 1

2.3

1.6

UEMOA

6.5

9.6

8.7

12.9

10.0

9.8

11.8

11.6

12.7

E.U
MERCOSUR
NAFfA

Source: W o rld Bank: World D e velopment Indicato rs, 2001. Pp. 333

There existed Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) since 1922, whereby each country issued its
own currency but exchangeable at par. Albeit, only the Belgian currency is acceptable in both countries and the
National Bank of Belgium controls monetary creation, with an input into the decisions by Luxembourg. The
me mbe rship of both countries in the European Union and the adoption of euro as the economy-wide currency
have superseded the operations of the BLEU.
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The EU has had a long gestation period since the creation of the customs union in
1957 and the transmutation into a single market for goods and services in 1986. The Union
consists of industrialised countries with high per capita incomes, diversified economies and
relatively low inflation rates. The Werner Report of 1970 recommended the establishment
of a monetary union among the then European Community members by 1980. The
European Monetary System (EMS) was formed as a monetary arm in 1979. This enhanced
exchange rate cooperation among members, creating margins of fluctuation around fixed
but adjustable central parities, and credit facilities for intervention. The Delors Report of
1989 enhanced the regional integration efforts and led to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty
on European Union in February 1992.
The absence of capital account restrictions and uncertainty about ratification of the
Treaty in the early period of 1990s led to speculative attacks against a number of the EMS
currencies in the September 1992-July 1993 period. The pound sterling and Italian lira were
withdrawn from the exchange rate mechanism and several devaluations of other central
parities occurred. In fact, the band of fluctuation around the EMS currency widened to plus
or minus 15% at the beginning of August 1993. In spite of the advanced level of
development of the EU members, the Treaty mandated a long transition period for the
countries to prepare and prove that they have converged to low fiscal deficits, low rates of
inflation and stable exchange rates before full membership of the Union 7 (Masson and
Pattillo, 2001a).
The European Union is presently characterised by the use of a single currency- euro
- which had been in circulation since January 1999 and co-existed with national currencies
before eventually replacing them on January 1, 2002. The EU has a comprehensive
structure to support the desired objectives of regional integration. The institutional supports
are provided by the common market, European Court of Justice, European Coal and Steel
Community, Single European Act, Common Agricultural Policy, and extensive policy
harmonisation in many other areas (Masson and Pattillo, 200 1a). Let us now tum to the
relevant institutional arrangement for successful monetary integration.

7

These are the elements of the convergence criteria which are as set of economic conditions which have to be met by EU
members before they can participate in the euro area. These criteria, often referred to as Maastricht criteria relates to

achievement of low inflation, sound public finances, stable exchange rate and low and stable interest rates.
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The European System of Central Banks8

3.2.1 Objectives and Tasks
We stated in the preceding section that the core institution for implementation of the
programmes of monetary integration is the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The
power to achieve the Community objective of monetary integration is vested in the
European System of Central Bank (ESCB). The functions and powers of the ESCB are
clearly stated under Title VI of the Treaty relating to Economic and Monetary Policy. These
are elaborated upon later in this section.

It was explained in Section 2 that the European Union adopted the single currency
model of monetary integration. This implies that each member country has its central bank
but there also exist a common central bank - the European Central Bank (ECB) which sets
the monetary policy and has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of bank notes within
the Community. The ESCB is composed of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
National Central Banks (NCBs) of all the 15 EU Member States. The Eurosystem is the
term used to refer to the ECB and the NCBs of the Member States which have adopted the
use of euro as the common currency. The NCBs members which do not participate in the
euro area are however, members of the ESCB with a special status. They are allowed to
conduct their respective national monetary policies but do not take part in the decision
making with regards to the single monetary policy for the euro area and the implementation of such decisions. We wi ll first focus on the activities of the ESCB before dovetai ling
to the ECB.
The primary obj~ctive of the monetary policy of ESCB is to maintain price stability
through setting of targets for monetary aggregate (M3) and inflation across the membership
of the Community. It is therefore expected to support the general economic policies in the
Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the overall objectives of the
Community. The ESCB is equally expected to act in accordance with the principle of an
open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources
(ECB Compendium, 2002).
• The whole of 1his section be nefits greatly from ECB compendium 2002 downloaded from lhe internet at
www.europeanunion.
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The Basic tasks to be canied out through the ESCB, in accordance with Article
105 (2) of the Treaty are:
to define and implement the monetary policy of the community;
to conduct foreign exchange operations consistent with the provisions of
Article 111 of the Treaty;
to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member States;
to promote the smooth operation of payment systems.
(Article 102: 1 & 2 of ESCB)
Based on these objectives and tasks, the ESCB performs a number of functions that
should bring into fruition the expectation of a successful monetary integration in the
Community. These functions can be categorised into:
Intervention/Advisory
Information Gathering and Dissemination
International Cooperation.
1.
Intervention/Advisory Functions: The ECB as the main monetary institution,
shall be consulted by the respective Community Organ or Member States on any
proposed Community act or national legislative provision in its field of
competence. It can on the other hand submit opinions to the appropriate
Community Institutions or bodies or to national authorities on matters in its field
of competence.
In fact, ESCB is mandated by law to contribute to the smooth conduct of
policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system.
11.
Information Gathering and Dissemination: The ECB, with the assistance of the
ational Central Banks, collect necessary and relevant statistical information
from both competent and appropriate national authorities, and from economic
agents. In this wise, the ESCB has to cooperate and work in conjunction with the
Community's institutions or bodies, relevant authorities of Member States or
third countries and with international organisations.
T he collected information are processed for distribution and application under
the guidance of the ECB which is empowered by law to harmonise, where
necessary, the rules and practices governing collection, compilation and
distribution of statistics in the areas within its fields of competence.

CBN ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW, VOL. 36, NO. 4
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International Cooperation: Anchored on the tasks entrusted to the ESCB, the
ECB shall decide how the ESCB shall be represented in the field of international
cooperation. Thus, subject to the approval of ECB, the National Central Banks
may participate in International Monetary Institutions.

3.2.2 Organisation of the ESCB
Article 108 of the Treaty establishing the ESCB gives express approval to its independence
from influence by individual or group of countries. The Article states inter alia
When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred
upon them by this Treaty and this Statute, neither the ECB, nor a National
Central Bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or
take instructions from Community Institutions or bodies, from any
government of a Member State or from any other body.
The Community Institutions and bodies as well as the governments of the Member
States have accepted to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of
the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the National Central Banks in the performance
of their tasks. The process of decision-making in the Eurosystem is centralised through the
decision-making bodies of the ECB which comprise of the Governing Council and the
Executive Board. As long as there are Member States that have not yet adopted the euro, a
third decision-making body, the Genera] Council, also exist. The pivotal role of the ECB
requires that we give the Bank some level of special attention.

The European Central Bank (ECB)
The ECB has legal personality and enjoys in each of the Member States the most extensive
legal capacity accorded to a legal person under its laws. In this wise, it may, in particular,
acquire or dispose of movable and immovable property and may be a party to legal
proceedings (Article 107(2)). The Bank shall ensure that the tasks conferred upon the ESCB
are implemented either by its own activities or through the National Central Banks.
The ECB 's capital amounts to EUR 5 billion. The NCBs are the sole subscribers to
and holders of the capital of the ECB. The subscription of capita] is based on a key
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established on the basis of the EU Member States' respective shares in the GDP and
population of the Community. It presently has a paid up capital of just over EUR 4 billion.
The euro area CBs have paid up their respective subscription to the ECB's capital in full
while the NCBs of the non-participating countries have paid up 5% of their respective
subscriptions as contribution to the operational costs of the ECB. When Greece entered the
third state of EMU on l s' January 2001, the Bank of Greece paid up the remaining 95% of its
subscription of the ECB 's capital.

In addition , the foreign reserve assets with ECB as provided by the Member States
participating in the eurosystem amount to an equivalent of about EUR 40 billion. The
contributions of each NCB were fixed in proportion to its share in the ECB's subscribed
capital, while in return, each NCB was credited by the ECB with a claim in euro equivalent
to its contribution. Fifteen per cent of such contributions were made in gold and the
remaining 85% in US dollars and Japanese yen.
As part of its independence, the ECB has its own budget and separate from that of the
European Community. This keeps the administration of the ECB independent of the
financial interests of the Community. The responsibilities of the ECB include drawing up
and publishing quarterly reports on the activities of the ESCB which are made available to
interested parties free of charge. Also, it shall address an annual report on the activities of
the ESCB and on monetary policy of both the previous and the current year to the European
Parliament, the Council and the Commission, as well as to the European Council.

The Governing Council
This comprises of all the members of the Executive Board and the Governors of the
ational Central Banks of the Member States without a derogation, i.e. those countries
which have adopted the euro. Only members of the Governing Council present in person
shall have the right to vote. However, by way of derogation from this rule, the Governing
Counci I may adopt Rules of Procedure, as part of its powers, to allow members to cast their
votes by means of teleconferencing. Each member has one vote and action is taken based on
simple majority, though the President has a casting vote in the event of a tie.
A quorum of two thirds of the members is necessary for voting to take place.
However, if the quorum is not met, the President may convene an extraordinary meeting at
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which decisions may be taken without regards to the quorum. The proceedings of the
meetings shall be confidential, albeit, the Council may decide to make the outcome of its
deliberation public.
The responsibilities of the Council are:
1.
to adopt the guidelines and take the decisions necessary to ensure
the performance of the task entrusted to the Eurosystem;
11.
to formulate the monetary policy of the euro area, including, as
appropriate, decisions relating to intermediate monetary objectives,
key interest rates and the supply of reserves in the Eurosystem,
and
111.
to establish the necessary guidelines for their implementation.

The Executive Board
Membership of this Board comprises of the President, the Vice President and four
other members, all chosen from among persons of recognised standing and professional
experience in monetary or banking matters. The President chairs the meetings of the
Governing Council except in his absence where the Vice-President takes over. He or his
nominee normally represents the ECB externally. Only nationals of the Member States may
be members of the Executive Board. They are appointed by common accord of the
governments of the Member States at the level of Heads of State or Government, on a
recommendation from the EU Council after it has consulted the European Parliament and
the Governing Council of the ECB (i.e. the Council of the European Monetary Institute
(EMI) for the first appointment).
The members are appointed on full time basis. Thus, no member of the Board can
engage in any occupation whether gainful or not, except an exemption is granted by the
Governing Council. Their term is normally for eight years and is not renewable. If a
member can no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if
he has been found guilty of serious misconduct, the Court of Justice may, on application by
the Governing Council or the Executive Board, compulsorily retire him and the vacancy
filled by the appointment of a new member in accordance with laid down procedure.
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The main responsibilities of the Board are:
1.
to implement monetary policy in accordance with the guidelines and
decisions laid down by the Governing Council of the ECB and, in doing
so, to give the necessary instructions to the NCBs; and
11.
to execute t hose powers which have been delegated to it by the
Governing Council of the ECB.

The General Council
This comprises of the President, the Vice-President and the governors of the NCBs of
all the 15 Member States. The General Council performs the tasks which the ECB took over
from the EMI and which, owing to the derogation of one or more Member States, still have
to be performed in State Three of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In addition to
this, the General Council contributes to:
1.
the ECB 's advisory functions;
11.
the collection of statistical information;
u1.
preparation of the ECB 's annual reports;
1v.
the establishment of the necessary rules for standardising the accounting
and reporting of operations undertaken by the NCBs;
v.
the taking of measures relating to the establishment of the key for the
ECB 's capital subscription other than those already laid down in the
Treaty;
v1.
the laying-down of the conditions of employment of the members of
staff of the ECB; and
vii.
the necessary preparations for irrevocably fixing the exchange rates of
the currencies of the Member States with a derogation against euro.

The National Central Banks
The National Central Banks are an integral part of the ESCB and are expected to act
in accordance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB. Thus, the Governing Council has been mandated to take necessary steps to ensure compliance with the guidelines and
instructions of the ECB, and can seek and obtain any necessary information from the banks.
Actually, Article 109 of the Treaty setting up the ESCB provided that each Member State
should ensure, at the latest at the date of the establishment of the ESCB, that its national
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legislation, including the statutes of its National Central Bank be compatible with the Treaty
and the Statute of the ESCB. Such national statute should provide that the term of office of
a Governor of a National Central Bank cannot be less than five years. However, a Governor
may be removed if he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his
duties or is gui lty of serious misconduct. A decision to that effect may be referred to the
Court of Justice by the Governor concerned or the Governing Council on ground of
infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application.

3.2.3 Monetary Functions and Operations of the ESCB

In accordance with Article 106 (10) of the Treaty, the Governing Counci l has the
exclusive right to authorise the issue of bank notes within the Eurosystem. In this
connection, the ECB and the National Central Banks may issue such notes which shall be
the only legal tender within the Community. Albeit, the ECB must respect, as much as
possible, existing practices regarding the issue and design of banknotes. In order to conduct
their operations, the ECB and the National Banks may open account for credit institutions,
public entities and other market participants and accept assets, including book entry
securities, as collateral.
The specific way in which theECB pursues its primary objective of maintaining price
stability is laid down in monetary policy strategy which rests on two pillars viz a prominent
role for money and a broad based assessment. The Governing Council chose a monetary
strategy which ensures as much continuity as possible with the strategies pursued by the
National Central Banks prior to the advancement into Monetary Union, even though the
launching of the euro presented a completely new situation.
Under the first strategy whic h gives money prominent role, the Council announces a
reference value for the growth of the money supply in a broad sense (M3), with inflation
being defined in terms of too much money chasing a limited amount of goods and services.
The m~>netary aggregate, M3, measures the amount of cash_in circulation, short-term
deposits in credit institutions (and other financial institution s) and other short-term
interest-bearing securities issued by these institutions. The reference value for the annual
growth rate of M3, since 1999 is 4.5%, and is intended to help the Governing Council to
analyse and present information contained in the monetary aggregates in a manner that
provides a coherent and credible guide to its monetary policy.
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The second strategy is the broadly based assessment of the outlook for future price
developments and the risk to price stability in the euro area. The assessment uses such
indicators as wages, the exchange rate, long-term interest rates, various measures of
economic activities, fiscal policy indicators, price and cost indices, and business and
consumer surveys. These kinds of indicators provide information on future price
developments.
The combination of the two pillars allows that monetary, financial and economic
developments are closely monitored and analysed. This also allows the ECB to set its
interest rates at a level that best serves the maintenance of price stability and thus indirectly
safeguarding the domestic and external purchasing power of the euro. The monetary policy
is formu lated by the Governing Council of the ECB , though its implementation is
decentralised with most of the operations being carried out by the National Central Banks.

The Monetary Policy Instruments
To achieve the basic objective of monetary policy requires that appropriate monetary
instruments be used. The purpose of the instruments used in the Eurosystem is to influence
market interest rates, manage liquidity situation in the banking system and signal the
general direction of monetary policy.
The major instruments are refinancing operations, fine-tuning operations, imposition
of minimum reserve requirements. The main refinancing operations are used to provide the
banking system with sufficient liquidity and to signal the general stance of monetary policy.
They are conducted once a week and have a maturity of two weeks. The longer-term
refinancing operations also exist and are equally liquidity providing transactions. These are
conducted monthly and have a maturity of three months.
The fine-tuning operations are executed on an ad hoc basis, with the aims of
managing the liquidity situation in the market and steering interest rates. The specific goal
is to smoothen the effects on interest rates of unexpected liquidity fluctuations in the
market. In order to stabilise demand for central bank money, the imposition of minimum
reserve requirements on credit institutions becomes the main instrument. In this situation,
each credit institution must keep a certain percentage of its own customer deposits in a
deposit account with the Eurosystem. This invariably stabilises money market interest rates.
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There also exist marginal lending facility and deposit facility which aim to provide
and absorb ovemjght liquidity. The interest rates on these standing facilities form a conidor
for movement of overnight market interest rates.
The backbone of the single money market of the euro area is the system for payment
transfers known as Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express
Transfer System (TARGET). The TARGET links together, the 15 national payment systems
i.e. one in each of the Member States of EU and the ECB payment mechanism. It is thus
possible to transfer large amounts of money between bank accounts from one end of the
European Union to the other within rrunutes or seconds. Because of its safety and efficiency,
TARGET is now by far the most important payment system in Europe and one of the largest
three systems in the world (ECB Compendium, 2002).
The legal provision for the monetary functions and operations of the ESCB are
provided in Chapters IV -VI of the Statute establishing the body. Within the provision, the
ECB alone or in conjunction with the National Central Banks are given the powers to,
among others:
1.
operate in the financial markets by buying and selling outright (spot
and forward) or under repurchase agreement and by lending or
borrowing c laim and marketable in struments, whether in
Community or in non-Community currencies, as well as precious
metals;
11.
conduct operations with credit institutions and other market
participants, with lending being based on adequate collateral;
111.
establish general principle for open market and credit operations
carried out by ECB or the National Central Banks, including
ann,Juncement of conditions under which they stand ready to enter
into such transactions;
iv.
defi ne the basis for minimum reserves and the maximum
permissible ratios between those reserves and their basis, as well
as the appropriate sanctions in cases of non-compliance;
v.
provide facilities and make regulations to ensure efficient and sound
clearing and payment systems within the community and with other
countries; and
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VI.

establish relations and do business with central banks and
financial institutions in other countries and, where appropriate, with
international organisations.

The ECB may offer advice to and be consulted by the Council, the Commission and
the competent authorities of the Member States on the scope and implementation of
Community legislation relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions
and to the stability of the financial system. Since the operations of the ECB like any
other central bank must result in profits or losses, it becomes imperative to
understand the legal provision. Article 33 of its Statute states that:
l a.

lb.
2.

4.

an amount to be determined by the Governing Council, which may
not exceed 20% of the net profit, shall be transferred to the general
reserve fund subject to a limit equal tol00% of the capital;
the remaining net profit shall be distributed to the shareholders of the
ECB in proportion to their paid-up shares.
In the event of a loss incurred by the ECB , the shortfall may be offset
against the general reserve fund of the ECB and, if necessary,
following a decision by the Governing Council , against the
monetary income of the relevant financial year in proportion and up
to the amount allocated to the National Central Banks in terms of
their paid up shares in the capital of the ECB.

Concluding Remarks

We have in the last couple of pages discuss various aspects of organisation and
operation of the European Monetary Union. We equally explained that the environment
under which the Union operates is clearly defined in its Treaty as free market or capitalist
state. Although this does not imply absence of institutional intervention in the market, this
is kept to barest minimum. More importantly, there is some level of relationship between
the various organs of the Monetary Union but the independence of decision making and
implementation, particularly for the European System of Central Banks, is mutually agreed
and adhered to by Member States, irrespective of their economic strength and weaknesses.
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This independence to a large extent remove incidence of mutual suspicion. In addition,
Member States join the Union at their conveniences and are subject to meeting the criteria
set for entry.
An important observation which cannot be ignored is the fact that European
Community is multi-lingual yet this has not resulted in overaching problem but rather
become strength in diversity.9 In synopsis, a number of lessons can be drawn from the
foregoing and this include:
· 1.
11.
111.

1v.

v.

v1.
v11.
vu1.

the long gestation period and stages for the establishment of the monetary
union;
the non-coercion of members into joining the Union at the same time;
the definition of operating environment i.e. capitalist environment where free
market reigns and freedom of operation is given to the monetary institution and
organisational structures to operate the monetary policy;
the provision of defined extensive legal framework to back up activities of the
ESCB and other organs of the Community and upholding of or respect for these
provisions by both the direct operators and Member States;
adoption of an appropriate definition of money with focused monetary policy
objective (price stability) and limited number of monetary instruments which
can be easily manipulated to achieve the desired goal;
the existence of well developed financial markets and diversified economy but
with mutually agreed high level of intra regional trade;
provision of acceptable profit and loss sharing; and
the use of language diversity as strength by pushing such problem to the
background and adopting the universal language of business - liquidity.

• See Tella, Sheriffdeen and Bolaji Adesoye, 1998.
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